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Abstract 
This paper uses Belgian firm-level data, covering the 1998-2006 period, to assess the impact 
on TFP growth of key labour force structural changes: ageing, feminisation and rise of 
educational attainment. Based on a Hellerstein-Neumark analytical framework, our work 
shows that an ageing workforce negatively affects TFP growth, whereas its feminisation and 
its tendency to be better educated do not have any independent positive or negative impact. 
Therefore, the TFP slowdown induced by the ageing process is neither gender biased nor 
counterbalanced by the rising educational attainment of the workforce. These findings are 
robust to many additional treatments applied to the data, and controlling for the different 
sources of endogeneity. Quantitatively, ageing workforces may have accounted for a -4.5 
percentage points loss in terms of cumulative TFP growth over the 1991-2013 period. 
Projections suggest that this number could reach -7 percentage points by the mid-2020s. This 
pattern is not so much dictated by Belgium’s demography, but rather its commitment to attain 
an overall employment rate of 75% by 2020. The latter almost inevitably implies almost 
doubling the current employment rate of individuals aged 55-64. 
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1. Introduction 
TFP growth is the most important factor explaining long-term income growth (Ashenfleter, 
2012). Changes in total factor productivity have a very important impact on many key aspects 
of the economy: competitiveness, sustainable wage growth…. That is why understanding the 
determinants of TFP growth is of utmost importance. In addition, during the past years, 
Belgium has experienced a decrease in TFP growth (Biatour et al., 2011) and, as it is possible 
to see in Figure 1, its performance in the early 1990s started being disconnected from that of 
both the EU 15 and Germany. Between 1990 and 2005, Belgium accumulated a handicap with 
respect to Germany exceeding 10 percentage points; and of 5 percentage points with respect 
to the EU15.  
Figure 1: Belgian TFP growth with respect to Germany and EU15, 1980-2005.  
 
Source EUKLEMS database 
 
Such a trend is raising many questions about the underlying reasons of such a puzzling decline. 
With this paper, we take a firm-level perspective and we analyse how changes in the 
composition of the workforce can affect TFP dynamics at the level of the firm. We are 
particularly interested in three types of phenomena. The first is the ageing of the available 
workforce; the second the increasing participation of (older) women in the labour market and 
the third that of rise of the educational attainment of (older) workers.  
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The fact that Belgium’ workforce is ageing stems from well-documented and abundantly 
commented demographic changes1: the share of workers aged 50 and more increased from 
18% in 1980 to 21% in 2005, while the share of workers with less than 35 years decreased 
from more than 30% in 1980 to about 20% in 2005.2 Such a trend is likely to remain stable for 
the foreseeable future and it might be boosted in the coming years, as Belgium will want to 
comply with EU recommendations in terms of its overall employment rate.3 To alleviate the 
rising cost of old-age publicly funded pension schemes, the Belgian authorities will keep trying 
expanding (the currently relatively low) employment rate among those aged 50-64.4  In the 
general context of TFP growth, the question is that of the contribution of this particular 
category of workers to the production process. In particular, can old workers be conducive to 
firm-level productivity growth? Can they provide the complementary skills needed for 
economic success? 
Another important socio-demographic trend is the increasing participation of older women 
into the labour market, leading to a feminization of ageing. The share of older women into 
private-economy activities almost doubled, passing from more than 3% in 1980 to 6% in 2005.5 
As pointed out by Peracchi & Welch (1994), the relative contribution of older women to TFP 
growth can be influenced by the higher willingness of new cohorts to participate to labour 
market and by their time spent in productive activities.  
Finally, it is important to investigate the connection between TFP growth performance and 
the composition of firms’ workforce in terms of (rising) educational attainment. Over the 
2002-2011 period, private firms located in Belgium have experienced a marked rise of their 
share of tertiary-educated workers. On average, the share of 2-year-college-educated workers 
has increased from 17.9% to 19.2% and the share of university-educated employees from 7.4% 
to 8% (Vandenberghe & Lebedinski, 2013).  The dominant view among economists is that in 
advanced (or frontier) economies like Belgium, productivity gains should be driven by the 
expansion of higher/tertiary education. 
Each of these three phenomena raises crucial issues that have received little attention so far 
from the empirical literature. Many existing studies look at the consequence of ageing 
population in terms of higher dependency rates and rising social security costs (Gruber & 
Wise, 2004). Another strand of the literature on ageing examines the retirement behaviour of 
older individuals (Mitchell & Fields, 1984) and its determinants by gender; for example how 
non-economic factors (i.e. family considerations) influence the decision of older women to 
retire (Pozzebon & Mitchell, 1989). True enough, some existing papers consider the impact of 
age and/or gender on productivity in the Belgian context (Lallemand & Rycx, 2009; Cataldi, A., 
S. Kampelmann & F. Rycx, 2011; Vandenberghe, 2013 ; Vandenberghe, Rigo & Waltenberg, 
2012, Vandenberghe, 2011a,b), and many more do so for other European countries (Crépon, 
                                                          
1 Between 1999 and 2009, the share of individuals aged 50-65 in the total population aged 15-65 rose from 
25.2% to 28.8% (http://statbel.fgov.be). 
2 Source: EUKLEMS dataset.  
3 Namely, the EU2020 objective of an employment rate of 75% for individuals aged 20-65. 
4 According to Eurostat, that rate has risen a bit, from 30% in 2007 to 37% in 2010, but is still well below 
the EU average. 
5 Source: EUKLEMS dataset. 
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Deniau & Pérez-Duarte, 2002; Van Ours & Stoeldraijer, 2011; Cardoso, Guimarães & Varejão 
2011; Börsch-Supan & Weiss, 2011). But these works aim primarily at assessing the 
determinants of labour productivity (or wages),6 not TFP. The shift from labour productivity 
to TFP measurement is important. The dynamics of labour productivity can result from 
changes in the capital-labour ratio, without reflecting changes in the underlying overall ability 
to use labour and capital input. Economists with a focus on growth thus prefer TFP as a 
productivity concept, despite the problems arising from its measurement. 
As to education, it is quite surprising that most economists have neglected the level of the 
firm to study the education-productivity relationship. There exists substantial evidence, based 
on the analysis of individual data, that general education (schooling) increases wages. Card 
(1999) for instance, summarizes various Mincer-inspired studies and concludes that the 
impact of a year of schooling on wages is about 10%. Similar results exist for Belgium (de la 
Croix & Vandenberghe, 2004) and many other OECD countries, pointing at slightly lower 
returns. The puzzling element of that micro level approach is that productivity is never 
measured or estimated. It is inferred from variation of wages under the assumption that wage 
differences must reflect labour productivity differences. And, again, the (implicit) dependent 
variable is labour productivity, not TFP. Macroeconomists focus more on TFP-related 
dimensions (e.g. GDP per head). They analyse country-level time series, and find some 
evidence in support of the idea that the continuous expansion of education has contributed 
positively to productivity (Krueger & Lindahl, 2001). But at that level, identification of the 
proper contribution of education is complicated by the difficulty to separate — using cross-
country data over long time periods — the causal effect of education on income, from the 
wealth-driven surge of the demand for education.  
In short, most of the above-mentioned works aim primarily at assessing the determinants of 
labour productivity (or wages) and focus on labour market issues. Few (if any) studies have 
examined the consequences of structural socio-demographic changes of the workforce on TFP 
growth, using firm-level evidence. Our study intend to fill that gap by analysing the combined 
effect on TFP growth of an increasingly older, feminized and better-educated working force, 
taking a firm-level perspective.  
Our analysis primarily uses firm-level data covering Belgium’s private economy over the 1998-
2006 period. These data contain good-quality information about firms’ performance and the 
composition of their workforce. Our work takes a sequential path: we start by focusing on the 
age dimension and simply control for the gender structure (i.e share of female workers); and 
indirectly for the overall skill mix of the firm, using proxies like the share of blue-collar workers 
and the cohort of birth of workers; in a second step we introduce separately the gender and 
educational dimensions of ageing and finally we focus on all three dimensions together. We 
base the analysis on the Hellerstein & Neumark (1995) framework and we take all necessary 
steps to correctly measure TFP and avoid possible endogeneity concerns. Our results suggest 
that most of the TFP growht slowdown observed in Belgium is driven by the ageing process, 
with the old categories of workers contributing less to TFP growth than the others. This effect 
                                                          
6 And determining the employability of different categories individuals, by comparing labour productivity 
profiles to labour cost profiles.  
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displays no gender bias, and the increased educational attainment does not significantly 
counterbalance the negative effect of the ageing process. Moreover, the negative effect of 
ageing tends to of similar magnitude across different industries and regions as well as across 
domestic- vs foreign-owned firms and multinationals vs non-multinationals. Therefore, the 
negative effect of ageing does not come from industry or regional differences, and it is not 
influenced by possible different managerial practices characterising foreign-owned and/or 
multinational firms. In the final section, we take a more macroeconomic stance, in the sense 
that we try to quantify the aggregate impact of ageing on TFP growth, both retrospectively 
(back to the early 1990s) and prospectively (from now until 2040). The key idea is to use the 
firm-level estimated contributions to TFP growth of different age groups, and apply them of 
observed and projected values (covering the period 1991 to 2040) of the labour shares by age 
for the whole country. The main result is that ageing-related TFP loss could be substantial, 
with a -4.5 percentage points loss in terms of cumulative growth over the 1991-2013 period. 
And we estimate that, by the mid 2020s, that cumulative loss could reach -7 percentage 
points.  
Demographic data show that older individuals’ share of the total working age population will 
keep expanding until the mid-2020s. More importantly, if Belgium is to fulfil the EU 2020 
employment rate target, it will almost inevitaby need to rapidly boost the employment rate 
of its older citizens. In that context, our results7 pose challenges for policy makers. Lifting older 
individuals’ employment rate is an absolute must-do to counter the surge of the dependency 
ratio.8 But, ceteris paribus, that policy may translated into lower TFP growth. The tentative 
conclusion is that more research and experimentation are needed to identify the mechanisms 
governing the relationship between age and productivity, and offer policy makers new insights 
as to what could be done to combat Belgium’s age-related productivity decline.  
The structure of the paper is the following: in the Section 2 we present the Hellerstein-
Neumark framework used in the paper; in Section 3 we describe the data and provide some 
descriptive statistics; in Section 4 we present the key econometric results. Section 5 contains 
the results of a simulation exercise aimed at estimating the magnitude of the overall negative 
impact of ageing on TFP growth, using 1991-2040 population and employment rate 
data/projections. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology  
2.1. Basic model 
Consider a labour-augmented Cobb-Douglas technology specified for a firm i in year t: 
                                                          
7 As to the negative link between age and productivity in the Belgian private economy, our results are largely 
in line with those of Cataldi, Kampelmann & Rycx (2011) or Lallemand & Rycx (2009). The reader interested 
by a discussion of Belgium’s labour market institutions, as well as a review of the Belgian evidence 
concerning the age-wage relationship, should refer to Zaks (2014). 
8 The ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or older than 64--to the working-age population--those 
ages 15-64. 
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[1.] Yit=Ai0 Kitα (QLit)β eτ.t + ωit 
Where Yit is productivity Kit capital and QLit a labour-aggregate à la Hellerstein–Neumark (HN 
hereafter) specified as a CES to allow for imperfect substitutability between labour types Litj  
[2.] QLit= [µ1 [Lit1]ρ + ….+ µn [Litn]ρ ]1/ρ  
with 
 j=1… n  labour types (e.g age/gender/education categories) 
 µj reflects contribution to productivity of firm i of type j labour 
Ai0  the starting value of TFP for firm i 
eτ.t + ωit capturing the dynamic of TFP (nb: τ is the constant rate of growth, common to 
all firms) 
ωit= ϴi + δit  the residual that adds up to the constant/common rate of growth, that may 
comprise a firm fixed effect ϴi correlated with the other explanatory variables 
To simplify notation, one can choose a reference category j=r and divide/multiply all the 
labour terms by µr Litρ . The labour aggregate becomes  
[3.] QLit= µr1/ρ Lit  ([Sitr]ρ + λ1r [Sit1]ρ + ….+ λnr[Sitn]ρ)1/ρ 
with  
Sitj=Litj/Lit ; j=1… n  the share of labour of type j;   
λjr≡ µj/µr ; j=1… n  reflecting the (relative) contribution to productivity of type j labour 
Finally, taking the log of [1] and injecting [3], the productivity equation becomes 
[4.] ln Yit= Bi0 + αln(Kit)+  βln(Lit) + β/ρlnΩit + τ.t + ωit 
with Bi0≡ln(Ai0) + β/ρln(µr)  and Ωit =[Sitr]ρ + λ1r [Sit1]ρ + ….+ λnr[Sitn]ρ 
Note that the first variables of the left-hand part of [4] correspond to the usual inputs of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function (lnKit, lnLit). By definition, the part of lnYit that is not 
accounted for by these amounts to TFP. Thus, the HN labour aggregate, with its labour shares, 
is de facto a determinant of TFP. In other words, specification [4] show that TFP is a function 
of lnΩi and thus of the different labour shares (Sitj ). Being interested in assessing the impact 
of the workforce’s structure on TFP, the key issue is thus to know if the λjr’s differ from 1 and 
whether there is (im)perfect substitutability (ρ≠1). Indeed, in the case of perfect 
substitutability (ρ=1) and all λjr’s are equal to 1, lnΩit=0. Expression [4] simplifies to the 
standard log linearized Cobb-Douglas, where all labour types contribute equally to production. 
2.2. Growth specification and accounting for firm fixed effects 
Now, since we focus our analysis on TFP growth, a further critical step consists of resorting to 
the growth-equivalent of [4] (i.e. lag T differences of logs, or log of ratio of Yit to its lagged T 
values). 
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[5.] ln (Yit/Yit-T) = τT + αln(Kit/Kit-T)+  βln(Lit/Lit-T) + β/ρln(Ωit/Ωit-T)  +  ωit- ωit-T 
This specification sets the TFP growth rate as function of the growth rate of Ωit. Hence, 
computing the evolution over the years of Ωit is a direct way to capture the sensitivity of TFP 
growth to changes of the structure of the labour force between the beginning and the end of 
the panel (more on this in Section 5). 
Note also that this growth specification leads to the elimination of the firm fixed effects: i.e. 
initial level of TFP Ai0 and ϴi (as ωit- ωit-T = δit- δit-T). This transformation can be crucial to 
account for time-invariant firm-level unobservables, in particular the propensity of workers of 
different type (i.e. age, gender…) to distribute unevenly across firms/sectors that intrinsically 
diverge in terms of their level of productivity/TFP.  
2.3. Simultaneity bias and two-step estimation  
So far, we have assumed a two-term structure for the error term. But many econometricians 
would recommend considering the possibility of a three-component error term. 
[6.] ωit= ϴi + γit + δit 
In this case, the ordinary least squares (OLS) sample-error term potentially consists of i) an 
unobservable firm fixed effect ϴi; ii) a short-term shock γit  (whose evolution may correspond 
to a first-order Markov chain, causing a simultaneity bias), and is observed by the firm (but 
not by the econometrician) and (partially) anticipated by the firm, and, iii) a purely random 
shock δit.  
As explained above, the parameter ϴi in [6] represents firm-specific characteristics that are 
unobservable but driving TFP level such as: the vintage of capital in use, the overall stock of 
human capital, firm-specific managerial skills and location-driven comparative advantages. 
These might be correlated with the labour force structure of the firm’s workforce, biasing OLS 
results. More educated workers for instance might be underrepresented among plants built a 
long time ago that use older technology. However, as stated above, the panel structure of our 
data allows for the estimation of models that eliminate these fixed effects (FE).  
This said, another challenge is to go around the simultaneity bias (Griliches & Mairesse, 1995) 
caused by short-term shock γit. The economics underlying that concern is intuitive. In the short 
run, firms could be confronted to productivity deviations, γit; say, a lower turnover, itself the 
consequence of a missed sales opportunity. Contrary to the econometrician, firms may know 
about γit (and similarly about its short-term dynamics). An anticipated downturn could 
translate into a recruitment freeze, and possibly also, into a multiplication of layoffs. A 
recruitment freeze affects presumably younger and more educated workers, and translates 
into falling share of more educated workers during negative spells, creating a positive 
correlation between more educated workers’ share and productivity, thereby leading to 
overestimated estimates of their productivity (when resorting to OLS or even FE estimates). 
Equation [6] suggests estimating a model where the dependent variable is the (estimated) 
TFP, following a two-stage strategy. The first stage consists of estimating the log of TFP as the 
residual of the regression of output on capital and total labour: 
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[7.] 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡)̂ = ln (Yit) - ?̂?ln(Kit)-  ?̂?ln(Lit)  
It is at this stage that one can control for the presence of γit. We follow here the strategy of 
Olley & Pakes (1996), then developed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) (LP henceforth), and more 
recently by Ackerberg, Caves & Fraser (2006). All these methods consist of using observed 
intermediate input decisions (i.e. purchases of raw materials, services, electricity…) to 
“control” for unobserved short-term productivity shocks γit and the residual of that first-stage 
LP-estimated equation can be used to estimate the second-stage equation  
[8.] 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡)̂ = B0 + τ.t +β/ρ ln(Ωit) + ϴi +δit 
where the error term only consists of the random term, plus the firm fixed effect. The latter 
can easily be accounted for when turning the TFP growth specification [9]. The dependent 
variable is not directly observed, but can be estimated as the residual of a regression of total 
output on capital (growth) and total labour (growth). And the residuals (in levels or growth 
rates) can then be regressed on Ωit.and the labour share it contains  
[9.] 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡/⁡𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡-𝑇)̂  = τT + β/ρln (Ωit/Ωit-T)    +  δit - δit-T 
 
3. Data 
In this section we describe the data used for the analysis and present some descriptive 
statistics. The data underpinning this paper consist of a panel of about 9,000 firms with more 
than 20 employees located in Belgium and representing all sectors of the private economy — 
with the exclusion of agriculture & mining — for the period running from 1998 to 2006. The 
advantage of using this time span is that it does not include the recent Great Recession, and 
so its potentially atypical impact on TFP performances. The data come from the Bel-first 
dataset and includes information on sector, location, size, capital, labour and value added, the 
average education attainment of the workforce and details on the ownership nationality and 
the multinational status. The information on the structure/composition of the labour force 
comes from the Carrefour database (i.e. social security registers). From this source we get 
individual-level information on age, gender and blue-collar vs white-collar status of the 
workers. We aggregate this information at firm level and merge it with Bel-first data, using 
firms’ unique identifiers. The resulting firm-level panel contains information on the age, 
gender and educational attainment of the workers employed by the firms. Note that 
educational attainment as such is only available at firm-level in the Bel-first data, while age, 
gender and blue/while-collar status exists at individual level in the Carrefour data. The 
consequence is that it not possible to compute workforce shares at firm level that interact 
educational attainment with age and gender. That is why we proxy education using the 
white/blue collar status and interact it with the two other dimensions. We provide evidence 
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that this approximation is reasonable. In the following we describe the other features of the 
data.  
3.1. Ageing 
Table 1 contains the means by year of the key variables used in the analysis. The last two 
columns (age mean; age standard deviation) suggest that ageing was already taking place 
between 1998 and 2006, and also that age heterogeneity was on the rise. Table 2 contains the 
breakdown of the workforce in 7 age groups (those used in the HN share-based specification 
used in our econometric analysis). It confirms the systematic reduction of the shares of 
workers aged less than 35; and, in parallel, the rise those of workers aged 40 and more.  
Table 1: Ageing. Descriptive statistics. Means by year 
 Value 
added 
[log] 
N. of 
empl. 
[log] 
Capital 
[log] 
TFP 
[log] 
TFP 
growth 
Age-
mean 
Age-std 
1998 7.743 3.762 5.921 -0.089 . 36.208 9.179 
1999 7.818 3.803 5.964 -0.057 0.032 36.485 9.261 
2000 7.911 3.876 6.024 -0.036 0.015 36.712 9.371 
2001 7.978 3.934 6.119 -0.033 0.007 37.079 9.433 
2002 8.036 3.966 6.184 -0.011 0.016 37.418 9.462 
2003 8.084 3.986 6.246 0.012 0.017 38.017 9.587 
2004 8.168 4.020 6.292 0.060 0.046 38.353 9.625 
2005 8.202 4.041 6.328 0.072 0.008 38.734 9.675 
2006 8.265 4.071 6.380 0.102 0.024 39.111 9.777 
N 75,437       
Source: Bel-first; Carrefour. Weight: number of fte workers in the firm 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: shares by age 
 <30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-65 
1998 0.299 0.186 0.160 0.130 0.103 0.077 0.045 
1999 0.290 0.179 0.163 0.134 0.106 0.080 0.048 
2000 0.281 0.176 0.166 0.136 0.108 0.083 0.051 
2001 0.269 0.172 0.167 0.140 0.112 0.085 0.056 
2002 0.257 0.169 0.169 0.143 0.114 0.087 0.061 
2003 0.241 0.165 0.167 0.146 0.118 0.091 0.072 
2004 0.234 0.158 0.164 0.151 0.123 0.094 0.077 
2005 0.227 0.150 0.163 0.155 0.127 0.097 0.082 
2006 0.221 0.143 0.159 0.158 0.131 0.102 0.088 
N 75,437       
Source: Bel-first; Carrefour. Weight: number of fte (full-time equivalent) workers in the firm. 
 
 
3.2 Feminization of ageing 
 
The second point we raise in this paper is that the workforce is not only becoming older, but 
also more female. Figure 2 shows that, in Belgium in general, the employment rates of women 
aged more than 55 years increased faster than that of men of the same age category. This 
trend is likely to continue in the future for many reasons; one of them being simply the size of 
the current employment rate gender gap among the older segments of the working age 
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population characterizing Belgium (and many other European countries) (Figure 3). Turning to 
our firm-level data, Table 3 shows that older women represent a growing share of the 
workforce of the Belgian private economy during the period 1998-2006. This is especially true 
for the category of workers aged more than 50, as shown by the last two columns of Table 3.  
 
Figure 2: Employment rate beyond 55, by gender 
  
Figure 3: Male vs. Female aged 55-64 employment rates. Europe, 2010 
 
Source: EU-LFS, 2010 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics. Share of older women by age group, levels and trends (ref=1998) 
Year <30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-65 
Shares Levels 
1998 0.309 0.282 0.248 0.243 0.219 0.176 0.150 
1999 0.311 0.286 0.252 0.248 0.223 0.183 0.151 
2000 0.315 0.295 0.261 0.250 0.229 0.188 0.158 
2001 0.315 0.302 0.266 0.256 0.236 0.198 0.163 
2002 0.316 0.304 0.273 0.257 0.240 0.202 0.168 
2003 0.316 0.310 0.282 0.256 0.247 0.209 0.171 
2004 0.313 0.311 0.286 0.258 0.250 0.215 0.175 
2005 0.311 0.309 0.295 0.260 0.254 0.222 0.180 
2006 0.311 0.310 0.301 0.270 0.256 0.231 0.187 
Share Indices (100= 1998) 
1998 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1999 100.7 101.4 101.7 102.0 101.8 104.0 100.9 
2000 101.8 104.4 105.1 103.0 104.6 106.4 105.7 
2001 101.7 107.1 107.1 105.5 107.6 112.3 108.6 
2002 102.0 107.7 110.2 105.8 109.3 114.6 112.3 
2003 102.1 110.0 113.6 105.5 112.6 118.4 113.9 
2004 101.1 110.2 115.3 106.2 114.1 122.2 116.4 
2005 100.5 109.6 118.8 107.0 115.7 125.8 120.2 
2006 100.5 109.9 121.5 111.3 117.0 131.0 124.9 
Source: Belfirst; Carrefour. Weight: number of fte (full-time equivalent) workers in the firm. 
 
3.3 Older but better-educated workers 
 
The third point we raise in this paper is that the workforce is getting more and more educated. 
Table 4 shows the age and the share of women increases together with a decrease in the share 
of blue-collar workers and a consequent increase of the average number of years spent in 
education. While the increase in the share of old workers might be compromising the capacity 
of firms to generate productivity gains, we expect the rising educational attainment to work 
in the opposite direction. Indeed, there is extensive evidence, based on the estimation of 
Mincerian equations, that better-educated individuals earn more. To the extent that wages 
are informative about productivity, more educated people should contribute more to 
increasing productivity. Some macroeconomists, analysing cross-country time series, also 
support the idea that the continuous expansion of education has contributed positively to 
growth.  
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Table 4: Ageing-Feminisation and rising educational attainment 
 Age-mean Share 
female 
Share blue 
collars 
Aver. years 
education* 
1998 36.567 0.249 0.563 11.490 
1999 36.609 0.256 0.551 11.562 
2000 36.695 0.262 0.541 11.631 
2001 36.764 0.271 0.529 11.709 
2002 37.336 0.280 0.488 11.769 
2003 37.873 0.281 0.482 11.818 
2004 38.109 0.284 0.481 11.766 
2005 38.363 0.289 0.475 11.816 
2006 38.689 0.294 0.465 11.803 
N 75,437    
Source: Bel-first; Carrefour. Weight: number of fte (full-time equivalent) workers in the firm. 
*Primary degree=6; Secondary degree=12, Bachelor=15 and Master=17 years 
As previously mentioned, the individual-level Carrefour database reports the white/blue collar 
status of the worker (alongside age and gender) but not the number of years of education. 
Therefore, there is an open question based on whether the white/blue collar status of workers 
of different age can be a good proxy for their educational attainment. One way to answer that 
question is to use firm-level data on the average education attained by the workforce present 
in the Bel-first dataset; and see if it is correlated with the share of white/blue collars. Figure 4 
suggests that this is the case since it displays a clear negative relation between the average 
years of education at the level of the firm and the share of blue-collar workers. Therefore, in 
what follows, we can be relatively confident about using the blue/white collar as indicator of 
the (rising) educational attainment at the level of the firm.  
Figure 4- Share of blue-collar workers & average educational attainment. Year 2006. 
 
Source: Bel-first; Carrefour. Weight: number of fte (full-time equivalent) workers in the firm. Based on lowess 
estimation i.e. locally weighted regression of y on x. 
 13 
 
4. Econometric results 
4.1. Ageing 
We start with the econometric analysis of ageing, leaving aside for the moment the two other 
structural trends of interest. The results are estimated using non-linear least squares due to 
the non-linearity of the problem and the need of estimating the substitutability parameter of 
our CES-within-Cobb-Douglas model. Our results are shown in Table 5: the first column 
corresponds to the analysis of the determinants of the level of TFP; while all the other columns 
present the results of the estimation of the TFP growth specification. In column [3] we control 
for the overall share of women and the share of blue-collar workers. In column [4], we control 
for cohort effect, which is likely to correlate with educational differences characterizing 
successive generations of workers. In column [5] we replicate the estimation in column [4], 
but we adopt the 2-stage strategy exposed in Section 2.4: value added is first regressed on 
total labour and capital using the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) strategy; thus correcting for the 
biases induced by unobserved short-term productivity shocks using the consumption of 
intermediate goods (here purchase of services and other goods) as instruments. In the second 
stage, the residual is regressed on labour shares.9  
All our results convey the idea that workers older than 40 years are less productive and 
contribute negatively to TFP and TFP growth. The inferred marginal productivities (that we 
report at the bottom of Table 5) — particularly those for the growth specifications — show 
that relative marginal productivities decline regularly with age, even when we control for the 
share of women, the share of blue-collars workers and cohort of birth (with the last two 
variables proxying for education). Model [3] suggests that workers aged 45-49 are 6.6 
percentage points less productive than those aged 35-39. Those aged 50-54 appear 25 
percentage points less productive and the productivity handicap is estimated to be 32.5 
percentage points for those aged 55+.  These numbers tend to be very similar across the 
different specifications.  Note that the results obtained with the level specification are much 
less trustworthy, as there is no control for firm fixed effects, which tend to capture age-based 
assortative matching (i.e. the propensity of young/older workers to concentrate in firms that 
are intrinsically less/more productive). The comparisons of growth vs. level equation results 
suggests that this phenomenon is particularly important among younger workers: they appear 
much more productive when one takes a growth (i.e. “within” firm) perspective. Note finally 
that our results for the growth specification deliver estimate for the age elasticity of 
substitution (i.e. σ≡1/(1- ρ)) that ranges from 2.2 to 4.8, in line with what is be found in the 
literature (Card & Lemieux, 2001).  
                                                          
9 We report only the results of the second step of the estimation in column 5 of Table 5. The complete set 
of results is available upon request.  
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Table 5 - Econometric analysis of the role of age(ing) on & TFP level and growth- 7 age groups:<30,30-
34,35-39[ref],40-44,45-49,50-54,55-64 
 [1] 
Level 
[2] 
Growth(FE) 
[3] 
Growth(FE)+ 
controls 
[4] 
Growth(FE)+ 
controls incl. 
cohorts 
[5] 
Growth(FE)+ 
controls incl. 
cohorts/2steps 
LP 
Cst 4.110*** 0.0377*** 0.0280*** 0.0488** 0.0684*** 
 (0.0266) (0.00115) (0.00400) (0.0180) (0.0199) 
α 0.112*** 0.0317*** 0.0423*** 0.0423**  
 (0.00119) (0.00271) (0.00313) (0.0148)  
β 0.908*** 0.638*** 0.574*** 0.571*** 0.273*** 
 (0.00250) (0.00487) (0.00583) (0.0244) (0.0677) 
ρ 1.054*** 0.792*** 0.794*** 0.790*** 0.540*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0128) (0.0169) (0.0383) (0.0710) 
η <30  (a) -0.599*** 0.079** 0.217*** 0.187** 0.263* 
η 30-34 0.209*** -0.026 0.010 -0.013 -0.087 
η 40-44 -0.212*** -0.144*** -0.066 -0.039 -0.140 
η 45-49 -0.537*** -0.237*** -0.116** -0.057 -0.210* 
η 50-54 -0.566*** -0.360*** -0.318*** -0.236*** -0.436*** 
η 55-64 -0.143*** -0.376** -0.396*** -0.277** -0.580*** 
Controls Year*Sector Firm fixed 
effects 
Firm fixed 
effects+ Share 
of women, 
blue-collar wks 
Firm fixed 
effects+ Share 
of women, 
blue-collar wks 
+ cohort 
Firm fixed 
effects+ Share 
of women, 
blue-collar wks 
+ cohort 
Nobs 75,437 65,750 48,777 48,777 48,076 
σ≡1/(1- ρ) -18.643 4.810 4.865 4.751 2.172 
Implied relative marginal productivities (1=35-39 ref) 
RMP<30 0.403 1.014 1.151 1.121 1.156 
RMP 30-34 1.192 0.982 1.025 1.002 0.965 
RMP 35-39  1(ref) 1(ref) 1(ref) 1(ref) 1(ref) 
RMP 40-44 0.771 0.880 0.954 0.983 0.923 
RMP 45-50 0.449 0.812 0.935 0.999 0.920 
RMP 50-54 0.417 0.701 0.744 0.835 0.704 
RMP 55-64 0.814 0.699 0.674 0.809 0.554 
Standard errors in parentheses All models are estimated using non-linear least squares, with standard errors 
robust to firm-level clustering. Source: Bel-first; Carrefour * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a): η≡ λ-1 
 
4.2. Ageing and gender 
As stated above, another important trend is the increasing participation of older women into 
the labour market leading to a feminization of ageing. How does that affect TFP performance 
for Belgium? We investigate this question by examining the role of the age and gender 
structure of the workforce on TFP growth. Table 6 contains the results for model [3] where 
the total workforce is split into the 7 age groups and the 2 genders. Please note that the 
reference category is represented by the male workers aged 35-39.  
Results in Table 6 convey the idea that men older than 45 are less productive and contribute 
negatively to TFP growth. This is in line with the results of Section 4.1. The retrieved/inferred 
marginal productivities (that we report at the bottom of Table 6) show a regular decline with 
age beyond 45. As to older women, Table 6 shows that both the estimated η’s and the implied 
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marginal productivities tend to be more or less in line with that of old men. If anything, it is 
for younger women that there seems to be a productivity handicap affecting TFP growth. The 
gender productivity/TFP gap turns out to be statistically significant only for women aged less 
than 50. In other words, we do not find any significant gender bias in the ageing process 
affecting TFP. 
Table 6 - Age-gender & TFP growth- 7 age groups:<30,30-34,35-39,40-44,45-49,50-54,55-64 
 [3] Growth(FE) + controls  
Cst 0.0713***  
 (0.0177)  
α 0.0266***  
 (0.00517)  
β 0.515***  
 (0.0272)  
ρ 0.774***  
 (0.0335)  
 Women Men Prob ηj W=M 
η <30  (a) -0.112 0.181** 0.001*** 
η 30-34 -0.170 -0.048 0.242 
η 35-39 -0.240 0 (ref) 0.048** 
η 40-44 -0.246** -0.048 0.064* 
η 45-49 -0.218* -0.149* 0.591 
η 50-54 -0.239** -0.248*** 0.950 
η 55-64 -0.432*** -0.202* 0.290 
Controls Firm fixed effects+ Share of part-time workers, blue-
collar wks 
 
Nobs 40,969  
σ≡1/(1- ρ) 4.432  
Implied relative marginal productivities (1=35-39 ref) 
RMP<30 0.925 1.117  
RMP 30-34 0.905 0.975  
RMP 35-39 0.835 1 (ref)  
RMP 40-44 0.833 0.970  
RMP 45-49 0.875 0.896  
RMP 50-54 0.868 0.814  
RMP55-64 0.654 0.883  
Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using non-linear least squares, with standard errors 
robust to firm-level clustering. Source: Bel-first 1998-2006; Carrefour. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a): η≡ λ-1 
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4.3. Ageing and educational attainment 
In this section we analyse whether the rising educational attainment of workers has an effect 
on TFP. Indeed, we can examine the role of the age and blue/white collar structure of the 
workforce on TFP growth using the same HN framework. Table 7 contains the results for model 
[3] where the total workforce is split into 7 age groups and blue/white-collar status. Please 
note that the reference category is represented by the white-collar workers aged 35-39. 
Results in Table 7 suggest an absence of real difference between blue- and white-collars across 
the ages. If anything, it is for the category of white collars aged 55-64 that age leads to 
statistically significant larger productivity handicap. The inferred marginal productivities show 
for blue collars aged 55-64 a handicap of 28 percentage points. The equivalent figure for their 
white-collar peers is above 50 percentage points. 
Table 7 – Age, blue/white collar status & TFP growth- 7 age groups:<30,30-34,35-39,40-44,45-49,50-
54,55-64 
 [3] Growth(FE) + controls  
Cst 0.0826***  
 (0.0189)  
α 0.0250***  
 (0.00590)  
β 0.560***  
 (0.0248)  
ρ 0.856***  
 (0.0319)  
 Blue collars White collars Prob ηj blue=white 
η <30 (a) 0.019 -0.101 0.238 
η 30-34 -0.119 -0.110 0.928 
η 35-39 -0.081 0 (ref) 0.395 
η 40-44 -0.213** -0.236** 0.814 
η 45-49 -0.331*** -0.282*** 0.681 
η 50-54 -0.391*** -0.479*** 0.524 
η 55-64 -0.275* -0.604** 0.065* 
Controls Firm fixed effects+ Share of part-time workers, blue-
collar wks 
 
Nobs 47,830  
σ≡1/(1- ρ) 6.947  
Implied relative marginal productivities (1=35-39 ref) 
RMP<30 0.903 0.873  
RMP 30-34 0.824 0.888  
RMP 35-39 0.850 1 (ref)  
RMP 40-44 0.732 0.781  
RMP 45-49 0.633 0.752  
RMP 50-54 0.591 0.551  
RMP 55-64 0.729 0.418  
Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using non-linear least squares, with standard errors 
robust to firm-level clustering. Source: Bel-first 1998-2006; Carrefour. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a): η≡ λ-1 
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4.4. Age, gender and white/blue-collar status 
In this section we combine together all the dimension analysed above. Table 8 contains the 
results for model [3] where the total workforce is split into 3 age groups and blue/white collar 
status (the reference category being the male white collars aged 35-39). We need to reduce 
to 3 age bands: <30, 30-49 (the reference category) and 50-64, in order to avoid high 
dimensionality problems and the loss of precision of estimators that comes with it. 
The results are reported in Table 8 and they are qualitatively in line with those presented 
above. Older workers age 50-64 contribute negatively to TFP growth regardless of their gender 
and blue/white collar status. Implied marginal productivities reported at the bottom of Table 
8 indicate that older blue collar women are 32 percentage points less productive at than 
white-collar prime age men (the reference group). The handicap of older male blue collar is 
estimated to be of 23 percentage points and that of older white-collar female and male 
workers of respectively 44 and 28 percentage points. However, these handicaps tend to 
diverge in magnitude between the different categories of older workers (male versus female, 
blue-collar versus while collar), none of the differences are statistically significant. Therefore, 
the key determinant of TFP slowdown is the ageing process. This does not have a gender bias 
and it is not counterbalanced by the increased education of the workforce.  
 18 
 
Table 8 - Age (<30,30-49,50-64), gender, blue/white collar status & TFP growth 
 
 [3] Growth(FE) + controls  
Cst 0.0814***  
 (0.0168)  
α 0.0255***  
 (0.00575)  
β 0.564***  
 (0.0240)  
ρ 0.861***  
 (0.0317)  
 Blue collars White collars Prob ηj 
Blue=White 
 Women Men Prob ηj 
W=M 
Women Men Prob ηj 
W=M 
M W 
η <30 (a) -0.076 0.045 0.241 -0.201 -0.019 0.110 0.502 0.349 
η 30-49 -0.276* 0.009 0.067* -0.187 0 (ref) 0.184 0.927 0.610 
η 50-64 -0.354** -0.207* 0.455 -0.489*** -0.335** 0.458 0.431 0.553 
Controls Firm fixed effects+ Share of part-time workers  
Nobs 50,398  
σ≡1/(1- ρ) 7.180  
Implied relative marginal productivities (1=30-49 white collar man ref) 
 Blue collars White collars  
 Women Men Women Men  
RMP<30 0.904 0.933 0.814 1.003  
RMP 30-49 0.718 0.891 0.847 1 (ref)  
RMP 50-64 0.681 0.775 0.559 0.715  
Standard errors in parentheses 
 All models are estimated using non-linear least squares, with standard errors robust to firm-level clustering. 
Source: Bel-first; Carrefour 1998-2006 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a): η≡ λ-1 
 
4.5. Industry, Region, Foreign Ownership and Multinational Status 
After having analysed the average effect of the workforce structural changes on TFP growth, 
in this section we check whether the effect of ageing varies across different types of firms. In 
particular, we consider the (broadly-defined) industry, their region, the foreign ownership and 
the multinational status of the firm.  
 
- Industry 
 
Results in Table 9 replicate the analysis focused on age (model [3]), but with a breakdown by 
broadly-defined sectors: manufacturing versus services.10 The aim is to assess the potentially 
divergent effect of age on TFP across different industries. This is because ageing might matter 
less for productivity in a service-based economy than in one where manufacturing dominates. 
Results do not completely validate this assumption. Marginal productivity by age profiles, as 
reported at the bottom of Table 9 are relatively similar. Yet, we find that older workers aged 
55-64 have a productivity handicap of 50 percentage points in manufacturing, whereas that 
handicap is only of 24 percentage point for those who work in the service industry.  
 
                                                          
10 A detailed definition of these two large sectors in terms of NACE 2 categories is to be found in Annex 1. 
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Table 9 - Econometric analysis of the role of age(ing) on & TFP level and growth- 7 age 
groups:<30,30-34,35-39[ref],40-44,45-49,50-54,55-64. Manufacturing vs Services 
 [3] 
Growth(FE)+ 
controls 
[3] 
Growth(FE)+ 
controls: 
Manufact. 
[3] 
Growth(FE)+ 
controls: Services 
 
Cst 0.0280*** 0.0343*** 0.0256***  
 (0.00400) (0.00618) (0.00571)  
α 0.0423*** 0.0280*** 0.0540***  
 (0.00313) (0.00435) (0.00450)  
β 0.574*** 0.653*** 0.519***  
 (0.00583) (0.00894) (0.00783)  
ρ 0.794*** 0.803*** 0.781***  
 (0.0169) (0.0232) (0.0245) Prob ηj Ind=Service 
η <30   (a) 0.217*** 0.260*** 0.154* 0.183 
η 30-34 0.010 0.022 0.003 0.781 
η 40-44 -0.066 -0.063 -0.063 0.997 
η 45-49 -0.116** -0.171*** -0.031 0.098* 
η 50-54 -0.318*** -0.318*** -0.312*** 0.942 
η 55-64 -0.396*** -0.607*** -0.213** 0.000*** 
Controls Firm fixed 
effects+ Share 
of women, 
blue-collar wks 
Firm fixed effects+ 
Share of women, 
blue-collar wks 
Firm fixed effects+ 
Share of women, 
blue-collar wks 
 
Nobs 48,777 26,081 22,696  
σ≡1/(1- ρ) 4.865 5.067 4.568  
Implied relative marginal productivities (1=35-39 ref)  
RMP<30 1.151 1.207 1.072  
RMP 30-34 1.025 1.043 1.012  
RMP 40-44 0.954 0.955 0.960  
RMP 45-49 0.935 0.872 1.035  
RMP 50-54 0.744 0.739 0.759  
RMP 55-65 0.674 0.442 0.875  
Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using non-linear least squares, with standard errors 
robust to firm-level clustering. Source: Bel-first; Carrefour * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
(a): η≡ λ-1 
 
- Region 
 
Table 10 shows the results of the estimation of model [3] for each region of Belgium. The idea 
is that different regions might experience dissimilar ageing patterns, thus leading TFP growth 
to be different across firms based in different regions. Results show that the two biggest 
regions, Flanders and Wallonia, do not register any significant difference when considering 
the negative effect of ageing on TFP, while firms based in Brussels shows that not only “old” 
workers perform poorly, but also the “young” ones.   
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Table 10 – Econometric analysis of the role of age(ing) on & TFP level and growth- 7 age 
groups:<30,30-35,35-39[ref],40-44,45-49,50-54,55-64. Brussels, Flanders, Wallonia 
 [3] Growth(FE)+ controls 
 Brussels Flanders Wallonia 
Cst 0.0328* 0.0333*** 0.0149* 
 (0.0162) (0.00509) (0.00708) 
α 0.0192* 0.0269*** 0.108*** 
 (0.00845) (0.00389) (0.00677) 
β 0.520*** 0.567*** 0.626*** 
 (0.0168) (0.00719) (0.0123) 
ρ 0.820*** 0.804*** 0.772*** 
 (0.0665) (0.0220) (0.0276) 
η <30   (a) 0.810*** 1.315*** 1.173*** 
η 30-34 0.606*** 1.068*** 1.050*** 
η 40-44 0.754*** 0.981*** 0.905*** 
η 45-49 0.705*** 0.897*** 0.920*** 
η 50-54 0.581*** 0.636*** 0.834*** 
η 55-64 0.417** 0.628*** 0.651*** 
Controls Firm fixed effects+ 
Share of women, blue-
collar wks 
Firm fixed effects+ 
Share of women, blue-
collar wks 
Firm fixed effects+ Share 
of women, blue-collar 
wks 
Nobs 4,960 32,540 11,277 
σ≡1/(1- ρ) 5.559 5.092 4.392 
Implied relative marginal productivities (1=35-39 ref) 
RMP<30 0.772 1.243 1.111 
RMP 30-34 0.612 1.084 1.065 
RMP 40-44 0.769 1.001 0.927 
RMP 45-49 0.739 0.948 0.974 
RMP 50-54 0.619 0.694 0.910 
RMP 55-64 0.448 0.703 0.729 
Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using non-linear least squares, with standard errors 
robust to firm-level clustering. Source: Bel-first 1998-2006; Carrefour. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a): η≡ λ-1 
 
- Foreign Ownership and Multinational Status 
 
In Table 11 we replicate the same exercise distinguishing among firms that are owned by 
foreign investors11 and those that have affiliates abroad.12 The idea is that foreign owned firms 
and firms that have affiliates abroad might be able to better master the ageing problem by 
transmitting from abroad the knowledge and the processes to better use the ageing human 
capital with respect to the domestic and non-multinational ones. Results in Table 11 show that 
this is not the case: both domestic firms and foreign owned and multinational and non-
multinationals suffer similarly from the ageing process. This can be interpreted as evidence 
that the ageing problem is not caused by bad managerial practices of Belgian firms that lead 
firms to do not value the “old” workers. Rather, this is evidence that the ageing process is 
affecting evenly different types of firms, regardless of their international activity.   
 
                                                          
11 We consider a firms as foreign owned if more than 50% of the equity is owned by non-Belgian company, 
as defined in the Global Ultimate Owner indicator of the Amadeus Dataset.  
12 We define a firm as multinational if it has at least one affiliate abroad using the Amadeus Dataset. 
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Table 11 – Econometric analysis of the role of age(ing) on & TFP level and growth- 7 age 
groups:<30,30-35,35-39[ref],40-44,45-49,50-54,55-64. Foreign Ownership and Multinational Status 
[3] Growth(FE)+ controls 
 Domestic Foreign Owned Non-Multinational Multinational 
Cst 0.0237*** 0.0707*** 0.0315*** 0.0202** 
 (0.00409) (0.0152) (0.00484) (0.00746) 
α 0.0474*** 0.0241*** 0.0462*** 0.0339*** 
 (0.00356) (0.00687) (0.00373) (0.00575) 
β 0.543*** 0.719*** 0.560*** 0.602*** 
 (0.00622) (0.0160) (0.00702) (0.0105) 
ρ 0.787*** 0.790*** 0.784*** 0.796*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0517) (0.0210) (0.0284) 
η <30   (a) 1.219*** 1.310*** 1.183*** 1.283*** 
η 30-34 1.008*** 1.073*** 0.984*** 1.062*** 
η 40-44 0.941*** 0.880*** 0.946*** 0.909*** 
η 45-49 0.899*** 0.797*** 0.902*** 0.830*** 
η 50-54 0.641*** 0.912*** 0.701*** 0.599*** 
η 55-64 0.597*** 0.570*** 0.470*** 0.773*** 
Controls Firm fixed effects+ 
Share of women, 
blue-collar wks 
Firm fixed effects+ 
Share of women, 
blue-collar wks 
Firm fixed effects+ 
Share of women, 
blue-collar wks 
Firm fixed effects+ 
Share of women, 
blue-collar wks 
Nobs 41,176 7,601 34,309 14,468 
σ≡1/(1- ρ) 4.703 4.772 4.637 4.892 
Implied relative marginal productivities (1=35-39 ref) 
RMP<30 1.146 1.266 1.114 1.220 
RMP 30-34 1.023 1.093 0.999 1.080 
RMP 40-44 0.962 0.903 0.969 0.928 
RMP 45-49 0.951 0.852 0.959 0.875 
RMP 50-54 0.700 1.008 0.769 0.652 
RMP 55-64 0.667 0.655 0.528 0.863 
Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using non-linear least squares, with standard errors 
robust to firm-level clustering. Source: Bel-first 1998-2006; Carrefour. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a): η≡ λ-1 
 
5. Quantifying the aggregate impact of ageing on TFP growth. 
In this final section, we take a more macroeconomic stance, in the sense that we try to 
quantify the aggregate impact of ageing on TFP growth in Belgium, both retrospectively (back 
to the early 1990s) and prospectively (from now until 2040).  
5.1. The method 
Referring to the growth specification of our model, the idea is to compute the value of TFP 
loss (in percentage points) driven by the gradual decline of β/ρ ln(Ωit /Ωit-1) in  
[10.] ln (Yit/ Yit-1) = τ + αln(Kit/Kit-1)+  β/ln(Lit/Lit-1) + β/ρ ln (Ωit/Ωit-1) +  δit - δit-1 
The key idea is to use estimated ?̂?’s, ?̂? and ?̂? (stemming from the estimation of model [3] 
described in Section 4 using 1998-2006 firm-level data) alongside observed and projected 
values of the labour shares by age13 Stj, in order to estimate  
                                                          
13 Note the drop of index i reflecting the fact that we no longer work with firm-level Bel-first data 
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[11.] ?̂?/?̂? ln (Ωt /Ωt-1)  
with Ωt ≡[[Str]?̂? + ?̂?1r [St1]?̂? ….+ ?̂?nr [Stn]?̂?]; j=1… n  age categories 
 
5.2. The Data 
The age labour shares (Stj) we use here — and to which we apply (firm-level) estimated⁡?̂?’s, ?̂? 
and ?̂? — cover the period 1991 to 2040; a much larger period that the one examined so far 
using firm-level Bel-first data. We calculate these shares, using i) population-by-age data 
published by Statistics Belgium;14 and ii) employment rates by age computed by the OECD 
using LFS15 surveys. The latter only cover the period 1991-2013. This means that we need to 
formulate assumptions regarding the evolution of the employment rate by age over the period 
2014-2040. This will be discussed in detail subsequently.  
The first element to be considered is the evolution of the age structure of the working age 
population (Statistics Belgium, 2013). The noteworthy trends, in the context of this paper, are 
visible on Figure 5. The first one is the rise of the share of older individuals in the age band 55-
64. The second one is the decline of the share of young individuals (15-29). These two trends 
are well in line with what most observers have been saying about demographics in Belgium 
(and elsewhere in Europe): less youth, more oldies! A less publicised fact is that the ageing 
process (of the working age population) should peak around year 2023. Beyond, the 
population projections from Statistics Belgium suggest that the share of the individuals aged 
55-64 with start declining and that, almost simultaneously, the share of young (15-29) will pick 
up. Anticipating somehow on our quantitative results, this suggests that the negative impact 
of demography (as such) on TFP growth should stop somewhere around 2023.  
 
                                                          
14 http://statbel.fgov.be/fr/modules/publications/statistiques/population/population_-
_perspectives_demographiques_2013-2060.jsp 
15 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=STLABOUR 
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Figure 5 - Evolution of shares of population by age of the working age population (15-64)   
  
 
This said, demographics is only one part of the full story. What really matters is the evolution 
of the employment shares. And these are driven by the product of population shares by 
(relative) employment rates.16 For the period 1991-2013, all data needed are available. The 
resulting employment shares by age are reported in Figure 6. Beyond 2013, as mentioned 
earlier, assumptions need to be formulated about the possible evolution of employment rates, 
on average and for earch age group. Hereafter, we expore three scenari (Table 12): the first 
(Scena1) assumes that employment rates by age will remain what they were in 2013; the 
second (Scena2) corresponds to the realisation of the EU2020 objective of an employment 
rate of 75% for individuals aged 20-65. We assume that this objective will be attained primarily 
by raising the employment rate of individuals aged 50 and more. More precisely, we assume 
that the employment rate of individuals aged 50-54 will rise (linearly) from 75% in 2013 to 
80% in 2020; and the one of individuals aged 55-64 from 42% to 80%. In the third scenario 
(Scena3) we assume that it will take an extra 10 years to reach the EU2020 target. Technically, 
this simply means that individuals aged 50 and more will attain the 80% threshold only in 
                                                          
16 Stj=(ERtj/ERt).Ptj where Ptjis the share of the (working age) population of age j, ERtj the employment rate 
applicable to that age group, and ERt the overall employment rate of the working age population. Note that 
the latter can be computed as the weighted sum of age-specific employment rates, where the weight are the 
corresponding Ptj.  
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2030.   
Table 12: Hypothesis about evolution of employment rates by age (2014-2040) 
Scenario 1 <30 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-64 
2013 .414 .803 .815 .817 .805 .751 .417 
2020 .414 .803 .815 .817 .805 .751 .420 
2030 .414 .803 .815 .817 .805 .751 .420 
2040 .414 .803 .815 .817 .805 .751 .420 
Scenario 2 
2013 .414 .803 .815 .817 .805 .751 .417 
2020 .414 .850 .850 .850 .850 .800 .800 
2030 .414 .850 .850 .850 .850 .800 .800 
2040 .414 .850 .850 .850 .850 .800 .800 
Scenario 3 
2013 .414 .803 .815 .817 .805 .751 .417 
2020 .414 .822 .829 .831 .824 .771 .576 
2030 .414 .850 .850 .850 .850 .800 .800 
2040 .414 .850 .850 .850 .850 .800 .800 
Source: OECD-LFS, our calculus 
 
The evolution of employment shares by age underpinning our analysis is displayed in the 
different panels of Figure 6.  In the upper panel, we freeze employment rates to their 2013 
level. And in this case, we logically get projections that are driven only by demographics. Quite 
logically, we get curves that replicate what was visible in Figure 5, beyond 2013. If we focus 
for a moment on the 1991-2013 period, it is quite striking to observe the intensity of the 
ageing process. This has been simultaneously driven by, both, the sharp fall of the share of 
young workers and the rise of the shares of workers aged 50 and more. The latter increase 
goes beyond what demographics dictates, and it highlights the prominent role of higher 
employment rate among older individuals since 1990 for the 50-54 category, and since 2000 
for the older individuals.  As to the future, under the first scenario (no further increase of older 
employment rates), Figure 6 (upper panel) shows that the ageing process of the workforce 
should peak rather soon than late. The other two scenari — where we assume that the 
employment rate of old workers will rise in order to fulfil the European target of a 75% overall 
employment rate — show that the ageing of the workforce will become even more 
pronounced, with a sharp rise of the share of individuals aged 55-64. While scenario 1 predicts 
the share of workers aged 55-64 to attain 15% by the year 2023; scenario 2 suggests that the 
latter could reach 25% the same year. Scenario 3 leads to similar conclusions, except that the 
25% peak is postponed by a few years, essentially reflecting the more gradual rise of the 
employment rate among individuals aged 55-64. 
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Figure 6 –Evolution of the employment shares by age (1991-2040), under 3 prospective scenari. 
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Figures 7a and 7b show the most important results of our simulation exercise. They are 
essentially fourfold. First, the ageing of the workforce may have affected Belgium’s TFP growth 
performance for quite a long time: the blue line in Figure 7a indicates that this phenomenon 
has been kicking since 1991, with a tendency to accelerate over the more recent years. The 
second result is that the magnitude of annual TFP growth losses remains quite limited; ranging 
from 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points. Third, as to the future, the demographics-only scenario (‘No 
ER change’) logically points at continuation of TFP losses until 2023, although at a more limited 
pace than what has been observed recently. However, the more realistic scenari — those 
where the employment rate of older workers rise markedly — translate into much larger 
annual TFP losses until 2020, reaching 0.55 percentage points, and then receding rapidly. 
Fourth. Focusing on cumulative TFP losses (Figure 7b) conveys a more synthetic perspective 
of the consequences of ageing under the three scenarios. Using 1991 as a reference year, we 
see that, up to now, ageing has caused a 4.5 percentage points TFP growth loss. In the future, 
the cumulative loss could reach almost 7 percentage points. Again, whether Belgium reaches 
the EU202O EU target in 2020 or 2030 only makes a small difference to the level of cumulative 
losses between now and 2030. 
 
Figure 7a – Impact of ageing on annual and cumulative TFP growth: 1991-2040, three scenarios 
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Figure 7b – Ageing and Cumulative TFP growth: 1991-2040, three scenari 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
This paper examines the role of different structural changes in the composition of the 
workforce on the dynamics of TFP. In particular, we focus on three main phenomena. The first 
one is the ageing of the workforce; the second is the increased participation of women in the 
labour market, and the third is the increased educational attainment of workers. Using data 
on Belgian firms for the period 1998-2006 we show that most of the TFP slowdown observed 
in Belgium is driven by the ageing process, with the old categories of workers contributing to 
TFP growth less than the other ones. This effect does not have a gender bias and the increased 
educational attainment does not counterbalance the negative effect of the ageing process in 
a significant way. This effect tends to be quite homogeneous across firms pertaining to 
different industries, regions and to different international involvement.  
Finally, when combining our firm-level results on ageing with country-level demographic and 
employment data, we estimate that, over the 1991-2013 period, ageing workforces may have 
already dented cumulative TFP growth by -4.5 percentage points. Simulations indicate that 
this cumulative loss could climb to -7 percentage points by 2020-2030. This pattern is not so 
much dictated by Belgium’s demography (the ageing of the working age population should 
peak around 2023). Rather, we show that it is primarily driven by Belgium’s 
commitment/obligation to attaining a 75% overall employment rate.  Raising older individuals’ 
employment rate is an absolute must-do to counteract the rise of the dependency ratio. But, 
ceteris paribus, at least in the case of Belgium, that policy may translate into lower TFP growth 
for a while. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1 : Sectors (Manufacturing versus Services) and NACE2 codes/definitions 
Nac2 code Manufacturing 
10 to 12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 
13 to 15 Manufacture of textiles, apparel, leather and related products 
16 to 18 Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing 
19 Manufacture of coke, and refined petroleum products 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
21 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical pro 
22 + 23 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic 
24 + 25 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
29 + 30 Manufacture of transport equipment 
31 to 33 Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and e 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply 
 36 to 39 Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
41 to 43 Construction 
45 to 47 Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
 Services 
49 to 53 Transportation and storage 
 55 + 56 Accommodation and food service activities 
58 to 60 Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities 
61 Telecommunications 
62 +63 IT and other information services 
64 to 66 Financial and insurance activities 
68 Real estate activities 
 69 to 71 Legal, accounting, management, architecture, engineering, technical 
72 Scientific research and development 
73 to 75  Other professional, scientific and technical activities 
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77 to 82 Administrative and support service activities 
90 to 93 Arts, entertainment and recreation 
94 to 96 Other services 
97 to 98 Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods 
99 Activities of extra-territorial organisations and bodies 
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